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I. INTRODUCTION 
Creation of binding law as a means of regulating new technology tends 
to follow behind the invention and utilization of such technology.1  Assisted 
reproductive technology (ART) is no exception2 given its recent surge in 
popularity.3  In fact, the lack of related legislation has had a profound effect.4  
This is especially true given that the fertility industry regulates itself with the 
help of independent associations.5  The judiciary specifically is having an 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., Muhlenberg College.  I 
would like to thank Professor Carl Coleman for his guidance and insight in writing this 
Comment. 
 1  See Tom Gjelten, Technology Outpacing Policymakers, Needs of NSA, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO: PRIVACY & SECURITY (Nov. 19, 2013, 2:54 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/11/19/246049281/technology-
outpacing-policymakers-needs-of-nsa (stating technology is advancing too fast for policy 
writing to keep up with it).  
 2  See Marina Merjan, Rethinking the “Force” Behind “Forced Procreation”: The Case 
for Giving Women Exclusive Decisional Authority over Their Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 
64 DEPAUL L. REV. 737, 738 (2015) (arguing law governing embryo use and disposition 
disputes has not kept pace with the increased use of IVF). 
 3  See Heidi Anne Duerr, Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology Continues to 
Increase in the United States, OBGYN.NET (May 23, 2011), https://www.obgyn.net/blog/use-
assisted-reproductive-technology-continues-increase-united-states (predicting IVF 
procedures will increase 32.7% from 2010 to 2050). 
 4  See Michael Ollove, Lightly Regulated In Vitro Fertilization Yields Thousands of 
Babies Annually, WASH. POST: HEALTH & SCI. (Apr. 13, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/lightly-regulated-in-vitro-
fertilization-yields-thousands-of-babies-annually/2015/04/13/f1f3fa36-d8a2-11e4-8103-
fa84725dbf9d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1e93a87e8899 (highlighting that the 
federal government and the separate states have given the fertility industry much freedom 
regarding regulatory matters, making the United States unlike the rest of the developed 
world). 
 5  See Alissa Stockage, Regulating Multiple Birth Pregnancies: Comparing the United 
Kingdom’s Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme with the United States’ Progressive, Intimate 
Decision-Making Approach, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 559, 573 (2010) (explaining fertility 
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especially difficult time deciding cases that involve disputes following ART 
treatment given the absence of legal precedent that courts rely on for 
direction.6 
In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a type of ART that assists many couples 
in making an embryo of their own, that when implanted in a uterus, could 
grow into a human being.7  The embryo’s creation takes place in a laboratory 
by fertilizing an egg of a female with sperm obtained from a male.8  
Normally, a couple creates multiple embryos at one time regardless of 
whether the parties intend to use all embryos created.9  Creation of multiple 
embryos is attributable to the high cost of the procedure as well as the 
possibility that the first embryo transfer may be unsuccessful and never 
implant in the woman’s uterus.10  Those who wish to preserve their embryos 
have the option to cryopreserve unused embryos for future use.11 
IVF reached the public sphere in 1978 when scientists successfully 
created an embryo in vitro, and thus, outside the womb.12  Since then, in vitro 
technology has successfully assisted millions of couples who otherwise 
would not have had the opportunity to reproduce and create families of their 
own.13  Couples, however, do not always have a happily ever after and 
consequently terminate their relationships.  Given that the fertility industry 
has failed to institute proper precautions, the fate of preserved embryos has 
become complicated, and ultimately courts are called on to resolve 
 
clinics are self-regulated by professional medical associations). 
 6  See Who’s Your Daddy (or Mommy)?? Maryland & Washington, DC Family Law and 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), BRODSKY RENEHAN PEARLSTEIN & BOUQUET, 
CHARTERED: WHITEPAPERS (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.brpfamilylaw.com/art/ (stating that 
because medical advances have not been accompanied by legal developments, there is little 
precedent on ART issues; so, courts are forced to resolve issues that few have before 
considered without precedent). 
 7  See Steven P. Calandrillo & Chryssa V. Deliganis, In Vitro Fertilization and the Law: 
How Legal and Regulatory Neglect Compromised a Medical Breakthrough, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 
311, 314–15 (2015); Michelle F. Sublett, Frozen Embryos: What Are They and How Should 
the Law Treat Them, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 536, 586–87 (1990). 
 8  See Peter A. Clark, Embryo Donation/Adoption: Medical, Legal and Ethical 
Perspectives, 5 INTERNET J. L. HEALTHCARE  & ETHICS 1, 2 (2008).   
 9  See id. at 3. 
 10  See id. (noting the advantages of embryos freezing include decreasing the number of 
stimulated treatment cycles needed to achieve pregnancy and decreasing the costs of ARTs). 
 11  See Sublett, supra note 7, at 587; Marisa G. Zizzi, The Preembryo Prenup: A Proposed 
Pennsylvania Statute Adopting a Contractual Approach to Resolving Disputes Concerning 
the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 21 WIDENER L.J. 391, 392 (2012) (noting a couple may 
choose to freeze embryos not immediately implanted for a later date). 
 12  See Merjan, supra note 2, at 737–38. 
 13  See Clark, supra note 8, at 1 (“It is estimated that 2.1 million married couples or 5 
million people in the United States are affected by infertility. . . .  Approximately 10–15% of 
infertile couples become candidates for various forms of Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
(ARTs) to assist them in having their own biological children.”). 
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disputes.14 
During the informed consent process before any treatment takes place, 
couples have the option to decide what to do with the embryos they preserve 
in the event of certain unfortunate circumstances.15  Couples may mutually 
agree that, upon divorce, separation, death, or incapacity, they will donate 
the embryos, destroy the embryos, or grant one of the two parents, also 
known as progenitors, sole control over the embryos.16  Sometimes, 
however, before ART treatment, couples do not explicitly agree to a certain 
course of action, or the agreement is ambiguous as to a method of disposition 
under the circumstances.17  Even more often, a change of circumstances leads 
one progenitor to refuse to abide by a prior agreement drafted and signed 
before the creation of the embryos.18  Courts have adopted varying 
approaches to resolving the issue of which partner has the right to use, donate 
or dispose of surplus frozen embryos when the couple disagrees.19 
This Comment as a whole will attempt to identify, explain, and resolve 
issues related to the resolution of embryo dispute litigation.  Part II of this 
Comment will discuss in detail the three divergent approaches courts use to 
resolve disposition litigation, namely the balancing approach, the 
contemporaneous mutual consent approach, and the contractual approach.  
This section will define each approach as well as illustrate how courts have 
applied them to resolve disagreements.  It will then discuss the advantages 
and disadvantages of adopting each approach.  Part III will suggest a uniform 
legal framework that legislatures may adopt and for courts to apply when 
resolving disposition cases.  This proposed framework will consider the 
advantages and disadvantages of each of the three divergent approaches 
discussed in Part II in relation to various situations and will be applied to 
each approach accordingly.  This section will also introduce Szafranski v. 
Dunston,20 a recent Illinois Appellate Court case that adopted a similar 
 
 14  See Merjan, supra note 2, at 738 (“When the couple that created the pre-embryos no 
longer agrees as to their disposition . . . the courts have had to decide the ultimate fate of those 
pre-embryos.”); Michael T. Flannery, “Rethinking” Embryo Disposition upon Divorce, 29 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 233 (2013) (explaining courts are often forced to confront 
disposition of embryos and construct alternative resolutions when couples fail to expressly 
state in a contract the disposition method upon divorce or when public policy renders the 
contract unenforceable). 
 15  William G. Beatty, Szafranski and Beyond: The Continuing Controversy over Custody 
Rights to Frozen Embryos in Illinois, 25 ILL. ASS’N DEF. TRIAL COUNS.: IDC Q. 1, 1 (2015).  
 16  See id.  
 17  See Flannery, supra note 14, at 233. 
 18  See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (denying wife’s suit to enforce signed 
and valid disposition contract due to significantly changed circumstances despite husband’s 
objection). 
 19  See Beatty, supra note 15, at 2. 
 20  993 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
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method of analysis to that proposed in this Comment. 
Part IV will focus largely on Szafranski v. Dunston, highlighting 
relevant facts, party testimony, and the analysis of the court.  Afterward, this 
section will distinguish the Szafranski case from the cases in Part II that 
adopted the contractual approach to disposition litigation as a means of 
illustrating why the Szafranski court erred in adopting the contractual 
approach.  Specifically, this section will assert that it is necessary to refine 
the definition of contracts used when adopting the contractual approach.  Part 
V will outline a model code to integrate necessary preventative measures as 
a means of avoiding embryo disposition litigation.  Such measures, if taken 
by fertility clinics, will clearly define the intent of progenitors and avoid the 
issues that surfaced in Szafranski.  Finally, Part VI of this Comment will 
summarize and conclude. 
II. THE THREE APPROACHES COURTS USE TO DECIDE EMBRYO 
DISPOSITION LITIGATION 
A. The Balancing Approach Defined and Applied 
Under the balancing approach, the disputing parties relay their distinct 
interests to the court and those interests alone govern the resolution of the 
dispute.21  The approach puts all discretionary power in a judge since the 
court is the sole entity that will balance the interests of the parties.22  
Adoption of the balancing approach takes place in both the absence of a prior 
agreement between the parties as well as in the presence of such an 
agreement.23 
Adoption of the balancing approach in the absence of a prior agreement 
took place in the Tennessee Supreme Court case Davis v. Davis.24  In Davis, 
the court faced a dispute between progenitors as to the disposition of 
embryos following the couple’s divorce25 and subsequently evaluated the 
couple’s conflicting interests.26  Ultimately, the court held in favor of the 
party attempting to avoid procreation because the party wishing to procreate 
 
 21  Id. at 512. 
 22  Id.  
 23  See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Bailey Henneberg, Maryland 
Woman Wins Custody of Frozen Embryos, PATCH: POL. & GOV’T (Jan. 7, 2013), 
https://patch.com/maryland/uppermarlboro/judge-awards-maryland-woman-custody-of-
frozen-embryos (describing Mbah v. Anong, CAD11-11394, CAD10-24995 (Md. Circ. Ct., 
7th Jud. Dist., Dec. 21, 2012), a case of first impression in the Circuit Court for Prince 
George’s County, Maryland). 
 24  Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601. 
 25  Id. at 590.  
 26  Id. at 604. 
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could still attempt to do so through another cycle of IVF.27  Notably, 
however, the Davis court stressed that if a prior agreement existed between 
the parties, that agreement would have controlled the dispute’s resolution.28  
Because there was no prior agreement, the court suggested that the balancing 
approach was only a last resort in which case the party wishing to avoid 
procreation would prevail.29 
Likewise, a Maryland Circuit Court adopted the balancing approach in 
considering the disposition of embryos, but unlike Davis, the court adopted 
the approach where a valid contract existed.30  In this case, the parties 
originally executed an agreement that granted the wife the embryos in the 
event of a separation.31  When that time came, however, the husband wanted 
the embryos destroyed.32  Despite the valid contract previously agreed upon 
by the parties, the court focused solely on balancing the interests of the 
parties to rule, explicitly ignoring the agreed upon contract between the 
parties.33  Given that the wife removed her fallopian tubes to help her 
conceive, she contended that she could not have children without using the 
embryos.34  Considering the wife’s permanent inability to bear biologically-
related children and the husband’s voluntary relinquishment of his right to 
the embryos, the court held in favor of the wife.35  It was only a coincidence 
that the court ruled in such a way that was consistent with the previously 
made agreement between the parties. 
B. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach Defined and 
Applied 
Courts that have adopted the contemporaneous consent approach to 
disposition disputes held that it is most important to promote the current 
intentions of the parties involved regardless of any past agreements.36  
Although these courts presume that contracts with terms related to embryo 
storage are enforceable, they will not uphold such agreements in disputes 
where one of the parties has had a change of heart.37  This means that “[i]f 
one of the partners rescinds an advance disposition decision and the other 
 
 27  Id.  
 28  Id. at 597. 
 29  Id. at 597.  
 30  See Henneberg, supra note 23.  
 31  Id.  
 32  Id.  
 33  Id.  
 34  Id.  
 35  Id.  
 36  See Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An In-
alienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 81 (1999). 
 37  See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782–83 (Iowa 2003). 
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does not, the mutual consent principle would not be satisfied and the 
previously agreed-upon disposition decision could not be carried out.”38 
In In re Marriage of Witten, the Iowa Supreme Court held that there 
was no remedy regarding disposition when parties disagree about the 
particular method of disposal.39  There must be contemporaneous mutual 
consent of the parties for a disposition method to be lawfully carried out.40  
In this case, the parties signed a generic form that required joint consent for 
release of the embryos unless a party became deceased.41  The form, 
however, did not specify the method of disposition in the event of divorce.42  
Upon divorce, the wife opposed donation of the embryos and wanted to use 
them to get pregnant.43  The husband did not oppose donation or storage but 
did not want to father biologically-related children.44  The court held that the 
embryos were to remain in storage, arguably in perpetuity, because there was 
no mutual consent between the parties.45 
C. The Contractual Approach Defined and Applied 
Most courts have adopted the contractual approach to disposition 
cases.46  “Under this approach, courts . . . enforce contracts governing the 
disposition of pre-embryos which were entered into at the time of [IVF 
informed consent] so long as they do not violate public policy.”47 
Consider Kass v. Kass where prior to creating the embryos the parties 
signed a consent form providing that in the event of divorce a property 
settlement would determine the disposition of the embryos.48  In spite of this, 
a provision in that same consent form called for donation to research if the 
couple could not agree on the method of disposition.49  When the parties 
 
 38  Id. at 778.   
 39  Id. at 772. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. at 773. 
 42  Id.  
 43  In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 772–73. 
 44  Id. at 773. 
 45  Id. at 783.  
 46  Carinne Jaeger, Yours, Mine, or Ours: Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes Through 
Genetics, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1141, 1146 (2017).  See Michele M. Jochner, Disposition of 
Frozen Embryos is Governed by Contract, SCHILLER DUCANTO & FLECK LLP: FAMILY L. 
TOPICS BLOG (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.familylawtopics.com/2013/10/disposition-frozen-
embryos-governed-contract/ (the contractual approach is used by five states, the 
contemporaneous mutual assent approach is used by one state, and the balancing approach is 
used by three states). 
 47  Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (citing In re Witten 
672 N.W.2d at 776); see Merjan, supra note 2, at 753.  
 48  696 N.E.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. 1998). 
 49  Id. at 181. 
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divorced and could not agree on the means of disposition, the New York 
Court of Appeals deemed the cryopreservation agreement valid and upheld 
the donation provision.50 
In In Re Marriage of Dahl, the parties signed an Embryology 
Laboratory Specimen Storage Agreement that set forth the terms between 
the couple and the clinic before they underwent the IVF procedure.51  The 
agreement did not address the disposal of frozen embryos following the 
dissolution of the couple’s marriage.52  The agreement did, however, provide 
that the wife, who at the time of the case wanted to destroy or donate the 
embryos, would have the final say over the embryos if the parties disagreed 
as to their fate in the event of divorce.53  At the time of separation, the wife 
opposed both the usage of the embryos herself and by another couple.54  The 
husband on the other hand strongly opposed the destruction of the embryos 
and requested that the court mandate their donation to another couple.55  The 
Oregon court upheld the provision in the agreement and ruled in favor of the 
wife, despite the husband having denied reading or signing the agreement 
stipulating that his ex-wife have ultimate decision-making authority.56 
In Roman v. Roman, a Texas court upheld a provision in a clinic consent 
form to discard unused embryos in the event of divorce.57  The court 
determined that the form was enforceable and thus, controlled the resolution 
of the disposition of all embryos.58  As such, the court ruled in favor of the 
husband seeking to discard the embryos, although his former wife wanted to 
implant them.59  Likewise, in Litowitz v. Litowitz, the Washington Supreme 
Court upheld a provision in a cryopreservation contract that provided the 
clinic thaw and discard any embryos still in storage five years after the first 
day of cryopreservation.60  When the couple divorced, the wife sought to 
implant the embryos in a surrogate and the husband sought to put them up 
for adoption.61  Irrespective of the progenitors’ desires, the court decided to 
uphold the contract’s thawing provision because more than five years had 
passed by the time of the court’s decision.62 
 
 50  Id. at 182. 
 51  194 P.3d 834, 836 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). 
 52  Id.  
 53  Id.  
 54  Id. at 837.  
 55  Id.  
 56  Id. at 837, 841. 
 57  193 S.W.3d 40, 54–55 (Tex. App. 2006). 
 58  Id.  
 59  Id. at 43, 54. 
 60  48 P.3d 261, 263–64, 269 (Wash. 2002). 
 61  Id. at 264. 
 62  Id. at 268–69. 
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D. A Discussion of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Each 
Approach 
Many of the advantages of one approach act as the disadvantages of 
another and vice versa.  As such, it is important to balance the advantages 
and disadvantages of each approach to disposition litigation to determine 
which approach best promotes justice in a given scenario. 
The major controversial aspect of the balancing approach is that courts 
act as “decision makers in [a] highly emotional and personal area.”63  
Normally, the justice system avoids involving itself in such personal 
situations, especially when parties have contracted privately as to the issues 
in question.64  In cryopreservation disputes, however, courts have sometimes 
found it appropriate to intervene.65  As the court in Davis mentioned, when 
there is no contract to refer to, the balancing approach is the best hope in 
bringing justice to the situation.66  Even in cases where there is a contract, 
more careful consideration of the situation may be necessary if a certain 
outcome severely burdens one of the parties.  This was evident in the 
Maryland Circuit Court decision where the court felt the need to balance the 
desire to avoid parenthood against the desire to be a mother.67  The balancing 
approach evaluates all relevant evidence including testimony from the 
parties involved as well as the significance of related public policy 
concerns.68 
Unlike the balancing approach, the contemporaneous mutual consent 
approach acknowledges that “decisions about the disposition of frozen 
embryos belong to the couple that created the embryo, with each partner 
entitled to an equal say in how the embryos should be disposed 
[of].”69  Moreover, the contemporaneous mutual consent approach addresses 
the biggest concern of the contractual approach by allowing a party to change 
his or her mind.70  In adopting this approach, Courts express the belief that 
 
 63  In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Iowa 2003). 
 64  See id. at 781; Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (“[T]he 
right of private contract is no small part of the liberty of the citizen, and . . . the usual and 
most important function of courts of justice is rather to maintain and enforce contracts, than 
to enable parties . . . to escape from their obligation on the pretext of public policy. . .”); 
Sublett, supra note 7, at 605 (“The right of privacy in the United States . . . has developed 
through case law applying various principles of the Constitution.  The right of privacy has 
come to encompass basic decisions concerning the family unit such as procreation and . . . the 
right not to create life.”). 
 65  See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992). 
 66  Id. at 604.  
 67  Henneberg, supra note 23.  
 68  Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
 69  In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Coleman, supra 
note 36, at 81).  
 70  Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 511; see In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777–78. 
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when a couple is unable to agree to the method of disposition, the most 
rational solution is to keep embryos as they are, which generally means 
frozen in storage.71  According to proponents of the contemporaneous mutual 
consent approach, other possible disposition decisions apart from continued 
preservation are final and irrevocable, and so delaying a hastened decision 
“makes it possible for the partners to reach an agreement at a later time.”72  
This notion, however, rests on the assumption that keeping embryos frozen 
when couples cannot agree does, in fact, promote the possibility that the 
individuals will eventually reach a more favorable agreement.73  On the other 
hand, critics argue that “[i]f the parties could reach an agreement, they would 
not be in court.”74  The main rationale for adopting the contemporaneous 
mutual consent approach is that agreements that in practice eliminate one’s 
right to decide whether or not to become a biological parent violate public 
policy.75 
Unlike the balancing and contemporaneous mutual consent approaches, 
the advance agreements of the contractual approach, if drafted correctly with 
the proper guidance, can help ensure that individuals who decide to undergo 
IVF treatment do so only after full contemplation of all repercussions and 
the making of a reasoned decision.76  If agreed to beforehand, couples can 
“determine the fate of their frozen embryos in a manner that coincides with 
their beliefs, morals, and feelings.”77  Prior agreements “leave a clear record 
memorializing [the] parties’ intent, which . . .  allow[s] the parties to rely on 
them; [thus promoting fairness].”78  This is especially true when the contract 
concerns family planning.79  Lastly, previously thought out and agreed upon 
contracts ensure that no party must unwilling embark on parenthood.  If a 
party knows he or she would not like to be a biological parent in the event of 
separation, that party can proactively choose not to sign away his or her right 
to avoid parenthood. 
Naturally, there are several arguments against using the contractual 
approach to resolve disposition litigation.  A large concern in promoting the 
 
 71  In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 778 (quoting Coleman, supra note 36, at 110–12). 
 72  Id. (quoting Coleman, supra note 36, at 110–12). 
 73  Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1135 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).  
 74  Id. at 1135 n.5. 
 75  See In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d. at 777. 
 76  See American Medical Association, AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 4.2.5 – 
Storage & Use of Human Embryos (adopted June 2016) [hereinafter AMA]. 
 77  Zizzi, supra note 11, at 413.  
 78  Amanda West, Note, Reproductive Freedom or Forced Reproduction: An Analysis of 
Minnesota Statutory Law Dealing with Parentage of Frozen Embryos After Divorce, 34 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 259, 263 (2012). 
 79  See Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (where the wife 
sought treatment to make sure she could have biologically related children given that the 
chemotherapy would likely render her infertile). 
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contractual approach is the length, content, and number of informed consent 
documents that patients must sign.80  Embryo disposition terms are 
sometimes in various documents81 and “present . . . information using highly 
technical language in densely packed, single-spaced documents, that may not 
even clearly delineate the different topics.”82  The nature of such informed 
consent forms can impede an individual’s ability to make a thought-out and 
informed decision,83 especially when couples are emotional.84  Moreover, 
disposition forms demand that couples imagine worst-case scenarios.85  
These scenarios focus on future mortality and divorce.86  As a result, 
accomplishing serious and careful drafting becomes difficult given that “[i]t 
puts people . . . in a really awkward position.”87  Though this should not 
matter, it is a factor that many critics believe ultimately prevents parties from 
contracting in a way that would justify adopting the contractual approach in 
all disputes.88 
Lastly, a major disadvantage of the contractual approach is that even if 
couples can fully contemplate every possible future scenario far in advance, 
their current views of those scenarios should not automatically take 
precedence over future views of those same scenarios.  Critics assert that 
“individuals are entitled to make decisions consistent with their 
contemporaneous wishes, values, and beliefs.”89  As such, “‘treating 
couples’ decisions about the future use of their frozen embryos as binding 
 
 80  See generally Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic 
Consent Forms Are Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57 (2011).  
 81  Id. at 67 (mentioning documents include those that cover risks and benefits, egg 
retrieval, etc.).  
 82  Id. (citing Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 931 (2000) (discusses problems of consent forms and argues for a 
change in the way consent forms are presented)).  
 83  See S. Michael Sharp, Common Problems with Informed Consent in Clinical Trials, 5 
RES. PRAC. 133, 135 (2004) (identifying poor readability and excessive length as barriers to 
obtaining informed consent).  
 84  See Beatty, supra note 15, at 11 (“Despite the existence of a presumptively valid and 
enforceable agreement as to the custodial and dispositional rights regarding frozen embryos, 
it may be argued by one of the parties to the agreement that the emotional pressure that the 
party was under at the time of signing vitiated genuine informed consent.”); Roman v. Roman, 
193 S.W.3d 40, 52–53 (Tex. App. 2006) (considering whether the wife was “too emotionally 
upset to give consent”).  
 85  See Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Factors That Affect Infertility Patients’ Decisions 
About Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1623, 1628 (2006). 
 86  Id.   
 87  Roy Strom, SCOTUS Ends Long Illinois Embryo Battle, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Mar. 2, 
2016, 2:25 PM), https://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/archives/2016/03/02/embryo-03-02-
16. 
 88  See Sharp, supra note 83, at 135.  
 89  In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Coleman, supra 
note 36, at 88–89). 
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contracts undermines important values about families, reproduction, and the 
strength of genetic ties.”90  The “possible lack of true informed consent to 
support the contract” is also an issue when parties do not contemplate the 
possibility of certain circumstances but those circumstances come to fruition 
and the prior agreement still governs. 91 
Irrespective of the above criticisms, on balance, the contractual 
approach is the soundest means of resolving embryo disposition disputes.  
Unlike the balancing and contemporaneous mutual consent approaches, the 
contractual approach attempts to help parties resolve the disposition issue 
both efficiently and effectively.  It not only avoids costly and timely 
litigation but also preserves resources used to freeze embryos for the right 
reasons only, not simply because a couple cannot agree.92  Furthermore, 
courts have continuously promoted the freedom to privately contract unless 
the matter is against public policy.93  The contractual approach is in line with 
this principle given that it precludes judicial involvement in private family 
decisions.94  “[B]y honoring the contract that the parties entered into, the 
parties are given the power in making these personal decisions while keeping 
the state from interfering in the matter.”95 
III. A PROPOSED LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To reiterate, this Comment will propose model legislation that all courts 
should adopt in embryos disposition cases.  As such, the following 
discussion articulates a uniform legal framework by considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of each disposition method in relation to 
various situations. 
A. Situations in Which Adoption of Each Approach is Appropriate 
When parties disagree as to disposition and there is no contract in 
existence to apply the contractual approach, the balancing of interests 
approach is the best hope for an appropriate resolution.96  As such, the 
 
 90  Id.  
 91  Beatty, supra note 15, at 8.  
 92  See Zizzi, supra note 11, at 400 (“The contractual approach is appealing due to its 
simplicity . . . .”). 
 93  See Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (“[T]he . . . most 
important function of courts of justice is rather to maintain and enforce contracts, than to 
enable parties . . . to escape from their obligation on the pretext of public policy, unless it 
clearly appear[s] that they contravene public right or the public welfare.”). 
 94  Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); Kass v. Kass, 696 
N.E.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. 1998).  
 95  Zizzi, supra note 11, at 400.  
 96  See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); see also infra Part IV 
discussing the Szafranski holding. 
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balancing approach should act only as a supplement to the contractual 
approach, not an approach used on its own.  For instance, it should not be 
the sole approach used by the court in making a judgment, as it was in the 
Maryland Circuit Court case when a valid contract clearly stated what the 
parties willingly agreed to previously.97 
The contractual approach is the only approach appropriately adopted 
when a contract is in existence and the parties disagree.98  Though it requires 
courts to adhere to and strictly uphold an agreed upon contract despite 
extenuating circumstances, courts should not shy away from applying the 
contractual approach.  It is the only approach that promotes both efficient 
resolutions of disputes and effective use of embryo preservation resources. 
In practice, the adoption of the contemporaneous mutual assent 
approach should never occur.  If a contract between the parties exists and the 
parties disagree, the contract should govern the dispute and adoption of the 
contractual approach should take place.  On the other hand, if a contract does 
not exist and the parties disagree, the balancing approach should govern the 
dispute and a court should weight the compelling interests of both parties.  
Realistically, if both parties are going to be able to contemporaneously assent 
in court before a judge, they should be able to do so outside the court.  
Therefore, adopting the contemporaneous mutual assent approach is neither 
effective nor efficient.  It not only results in costly and timely litigation but 
also depletes resources used to freeze embryos.99 
B. Szafranski Resolved Using the Proposed Legal Framework 
The Illinois Appellate Court’s basic approach used to resolve 
Szafranski v. Dunston100 is consistent with the proposed framework, and, 
therefore, serves as an example of the efficient and effective nature of the 
proposed legal framework above.  The Szafranski court held that when 
parties disagree in the presence of a contract, the contractual approach 
governs.101  As such the court found that the oral agreement between the 
parties—providing that the plaintiff, Szafranski, would unconditionally 
donate his sperm for the defendant’s unconditional use of the resulting 
embryos—was valid and completely binding.102  This resulted in the 
defendant, Dunston, entitled to sole custody.103 
 
 97  See generally Sublett, supra note 7. 
 98  See Zizzi, supra note 11, at 400 (“The contractual approach is appealing due to its 
simplicity . . . .”). 
 99  See id.  
 100  34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
 101  Id. at 1162.   
 102  Id.  
 103  Id. at 1161.  
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Anticipating an appeal of the decision, the court added that when parties 
disagree in the absence of a contract, the balancing approach governs.104  In 
this case, the court believed that Dunston’s desire to have a biological child 
and the fact she could not without using the embryos (due to infertility), 
outweighed Szafranski’s desire to avoid parenthood.105  Note, given the 
above, the court implicitly suggested that the contemporaneous mutual 
consent approach has no place in the debate when parties disagree and want 
a final resolution to their dispute. 
IV. SZAFRANSKI GOT IT WRONG: DEFINING CONTRACTS USED IN THE 
CONTRACTUAL APPROACH 
Dependence on an appropriate contract is vital to the justified use of the 
contractual approach.  As such, refining of what constitutes an appropriate 
contract in embryo disposition litigation must take place. 
A. Relevant Case Facts that Illustrate the Court’s Error 
In 2009, Szafranski and Dunston began dating and shortly thereafter in 
2010, the doctor diagnosed Dunston with lymphoma.106  The doctor 
informed Dunston that her course of treatment could result in infertility.107  
Given her desire to have biological children, she met with a fertility specialist 
at the Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation (“Northwestern”), who 
informed her of the option to create and freeze embryos.108  After her meeting 
with the Northwestern specialist, Dunston called Szafranski and told him her 
options.109  She was nervous about using an anonymous sperm donor and so 
asked Szafranski if he would “be willing to provide sperm to make pre-
embryos with her.”110  Szafranski agreed to Dunston’s request over the 
phone.111 
The next day, Szafranski and Dunston met with Northwestern staff.112  
Both parties signed and dated the “Informed Consent for Assisted 
Reproduction” (“Informed Consent”) that explained Northwestern’s legal 
rights and obligations.113  Along with providing the clinic’s legal rights and 
obligations, it contained a provision applicable to the disposing of preserved 
 
 104  Id.  
 105  Id. 
 106  Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1137. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. at 1137–38. 
 109  Id. at 1138. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1138. 
 113  Id. 
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embryos: 
Because of the possibility of you and/or your partner’s separation, 
divorce, death, or mental incapacitation, it is important, if you 
choose to cryopreserve your embryos, for you to decide what 
should be done with any of your cryopreserved embryos that 
remain in the laboratory in such an eventuality.  Since this is a 
rapidly evolving field, both medically and legally, the clinic 
cannot guarantee what the available or acceptable avenues for 
disposition will be at any future date.  At the present time, the 
options are: (1) discarding the cryopreserved embryos, (2) 
donating the cryopreserved embryos for approved research 
studies, [or] (3) donating the cryopreserved embryos to another 
couple in order to attempt pregnancy . . . .  No use can be made of 
these embryos without the consent of both partners (if 
applicable).114 
Dunston and Szafranski initialed next to the option to donate the 
embryos to another couple.115  After their appointment at Northwestern, 
Szafranski and Dunston met with an attorney at the recommendation of the 
clinic.116  With the attorney, they discussed two possible arrangements: a co-
parenting agreement where Szafranski would be, in the very least, financially 
involved in the child’s life, and a sperm donor agreement, where Szafranski 
would have no obligations and waive his parental rights.117  Following the 
meeting, Dunston sent an email to the attorney stating that the couple had 
decided to go forward with the co-parenting agreement.118  The attorney 
prepared this agreement and emailed it to Dunston. Neither party ever signed 
the emailed agreement.119 
Shortly after Dunston began chemotherapy, Szafranski ended their 
relationship.120  They did not speak in the interim.121  A couple months later, 
Szafranski sent Dunston an email expressing his concern in having created 
the embryos with Dunston and in a second email announced, “that he could 
not let her use the pre-embryos and that he wanted them to be donated to 
science or research.”122  At first, Szafranski agreed to sign over the embryos 
to Dunston but then changed his mind and filed a lawsuit against Dunston to 
enjoin her from using the embryos.123  Dunston filed a counterclaim seeking 
 
 114  Id. 
 115  Id. at 1139. 
 116  Id.  
 117  Id. 
 118  Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1139. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. at 1140. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. at 1141. 
 123  Id. 
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sole custody and control over the pre-embryos.124 
B. Relevant Testimony by the Parties Involved 
Szafranski testified that he “understood the Informed Consent as 
requiring both his and [Dunston]’s approval prior to any use of the pre-
embryos.”125  He also testified that during their meeting with Northwestern, 
the clinic told him that any use of the pre-embryos would require the consent 
of both individuals because no marriage bound the parties.126  He 
acknowledged that the clinic encouraged he seek an attorney to determine 
the fate of the embryos in the event of a separation.127  In spite of the above, 
he relentlessly asserted that he never agreed to any term that would give 
Dunston sole control over the disposition of the pre-embryos in the event of 
their separation.128  As a matter of fact, he believed that any such term 
contradicted what the attorney told him his rights would be as a co-parent 
and what he and Dunston both agreed to in the clinic’s Informed Consent 
document.129 
By contrast, Dunston testified that it was her understanding that she and 
Szafranski “always agreed that he was doing this to help [her] create embryos 
to have a biological child with no other attachment.” 130  Moreover, “it was 
her understanding that she and Szafranski would be documenting their 
wishes through an attorney as opposed to in the Informed Consent.”131 
Furthermore, she asserted that she and Szafranski “agreed that he was 
donating the sperm for one reason and one reason only, for [her] to have 
biological children after [her] cancer treatment.”132  She claimed that “there 
was really no need to ask for that term to be put into a form” given the nature 
of their oral agreement and mutual understanding of why she was undergoing 
IVF.133 Regarding the email she sent the attorney requesting the co-parenting 
agreement as opposed to the sperm donation agreement, Dunston testified 
that she was going through a very stressful time and did not thoroughly 
review the draft.134 
 
 124  Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1136. 
 125  Id. at 1142. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. at 1142–43. 
 130  Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1143. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. 
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C. Appellate Court’s Ruling 
Szafranski conceded that he formed an oral contract with Dunston to 
create embryos.135  Thus, the court only needed to determine the scope of the 
agreement between the parties— whether the oral contract was to create 
embryos or to create babies.136  “At trial, both [Szafranski] and [Dunston] 
testified that they never discussed whether [Szafranski’s] consent would be 
needed to use the pre-embryos” to create offspring.137  Nonetheless, because 
Szafranski admitted that it ‘“never crossed [his] mind’” to place limitations 
on Dunston’s use of the pre-embryos,138 the court determined it was 
reasonable to infer that he never desired to limit Dunston’s use of the pre-
embryos in any way.139 
Szafranski argued that because the oral agreement was ambiguous and 
“silent on the issue of whether [Dunston] has an unlimited and unqualified 
right to use the pre-embryos,” it could not “reflect the parties’ mutual assent 
or intent to grant [Dunston] such a right.”140  He argued that “the court should 
honor the parties’ silence” with respect to creating limitations.141  The court 
addressed Szafranski’s arguments by reiterating that the consent form 
contemplated ‘“another agreement between the parties may govern the future 
disposition of the embryos”‘ and that ‘“Northwestern will abide by any 
agreement reached between the parties.”‘142  To that end, the court held that 
“[Dunston and Szafranski’s] previous oral agreement [which took place over 
the phone,] [was] not contradicted or modified by any language in the 
Informed Consent” and so was valid and binding.143 
According to the court, “[t]he Informed Consent merely advised the 
parties that Northwestern had no legal right to use or dispose of the pre-
embryos in any manner that either [Szafranski] or [Dunston] would find 
objectionable.”144  Furthermore, “the informed consent agreement was 
primarily a contract between the couple and the clinic, rather than between 
the donors themselves.”145  Since there was no subsequent signed contract 
following the couple’s execution of the Informed Consent, the oral 
agreement unconditionally bound Szafranski in the absolute, and so Dunston 
 
 135  Id. at 1148. 
 136  Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1148. 
 137  Id. at 1152. 
 138  Id.  
 139  Id. 
 140  Id. at 1150.  
 141  Id. 
 142  Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1153. 
 143  Id.  
 144  Id. at 1155. 
 145  Beatty, supra note 15, at 5. 
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had sole custody.146 
D. Criticism of the Court’s Analysis in Szafranski 
1. The Danger in Inferring a Contract Existed 
A court must not infer the existence of an agreement without sufficient 
evidence.  By remaining silent on the issue of the embryos’ use, Szafranski 
did not negotiate a contract that gave him the right to later object to their 
use.”147  In other words, under the facts of the case, which involved a man 
who provided sperm outside a committed relationship, expressly to help a 
woman preserve her ability to have children in the future, it was reasonable 
to assume the man consented to the embryos’ future use by that woman.148  
One critic, however, has gone so far as to say “[i]t appears that in the absence 
of a written contract between the couple, Illinois courts will assume that 
creating an embryo is the same as agreeing to the birth of a child.”149  Despite 
the actual extent to which the court’s inference applies, such assumptions in 
this context are exceedingly dangerous because parenthood is at stake.150 
At the heart of this discussion is the idea of an oral agreement.  “An 
oral agreement is binding where there is an offer, an acceptance, and a 
meeting of the minds as to the terms of the agreement.”151  While there was 
an oral contract between the Szafranski parties in regard to creating the 
embryos for preservation,152 there was no concrete evidence that suggested 
Szafranski gave up his right to consent to implantation of the embryos.153  
Szafranski explicitly stated that he would provide Dunston with his sperm so 
that she could create the embryos and have the option, not the right, to use 
the embryos to have biological children.154  It was unclear, at the time that 
he agreed to the oral contract whether Dunston would, in fact, be infertile 
after chemotherapy treatment.155  Creating the embryos was merely a 
precaution in case the chemotherapy treatment had, in fact, rendered Dunston 
infertile.156  For that reason, while it is true that Szafranski and Dunston had 
 
 146  Id.  
 147  Strom, supra note 87.  
 148  Id.  
 149  Id.   
 150  Id. 
 151  Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1147 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (citing Bruzas v. 
Richardson, 945 N.E.2d 1208 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)). 
 152  Id. at 1148. 
 153  See id. at 1138, 1150. 
 154  Id. at 1138 (stating he would be willing to make pre-embryos with her); see also id. at 
1142. 
 155  Id. at 1137–38. 
 156  Id.  
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a meeting of the minds as to the creation of embryos, there was no meeting 
of the minds over the eventual implantation of embryos.157  Though 
Szafranski himself admitted that placing limitations on Dunston’s “use of the 
pre-embryos ‘never crossed [his] mind,’” that does not mean there was a 
meeting of the minds as to that issue.158  The silence and ambiguity 
surrounding any limitations should have encouraged the court, like others 
before it, to lean in favor of the individual attempting to avoid parenthood.159 
2. The Danger in Relying on an Oral Agreement as a Contract 
An additional criticism of Szafranski involves the court’s reliance on 
an oral agreement.160  The contract the court relied upon was the oral 
agreement made between the parties over the phone, not the contract made 
via the Informed Consent.161  In fact, the Szafranski court was the first to use 
an oral contract as a means of adopting the contractual approach in a 
disposition suit.162  The majority of cases that adopted the contractual 
approach upheld written contracts—specifically informed consent 
documents—and considered those to be the disposition agreements that 
bound the parties in dispute.163  By contrast, the Szafranski court stated that 
the Informed Consent was “a contract between the couple and the clinic, 
rather than between the donors themselves.”164  There was no rational reason 
for the Szafranski court to rely on the ambiguous oral contract between the 
parties when no other court had done so in the presence of an informed 
consent document.165 
Moreover, it appears that what the court believed were the terms of the 
oral contract directly contradicted not only the signed Informed Consent that 
required both parties to consent to usage of the embryos but also the later 
actions of both parties.166  For instance, if “Northwestern had no legal right 
 
 157  See Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1138, 1150. 
 158  Id. at 1152. 
 159  See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). 
 160  Beatty, supra note 15, at 5 
 161  Id.; Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1153. 
 162  See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 182 (N.Y. 1998); Dahl v. Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 836 
(Or. Ct. App. 2008); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 54 (Tex. App. 2006); Litowitz v. 
Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 268 (Wash. 2002). 
 163  See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182 (upholding a provision in a cryopreservation agreement 
within the informed consent documents); Dahl, 194 P.3d at 836 (upholding a provision in an 
Embryology Laboratory Specimen Storage Agreement which the parties signed); Roman, 193 
S.W.3d at 54 (upholding a provision in a clinic consent form); Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 268 
(upholding a provision in a cryopreservation contract). 
 164  Beatty, supra note 15, at 5; Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1153. 
 165  See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182; Dahl, 194 P.3d at 836; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 54; 
Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 268. 
 166  See Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1139, 1142 (Dunston sent an email to the attorney stating 
the couple decided to proceed with the co-parenting agreement. Szafranski testified, to which 
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to use or dispose of the pre-embryos in any manner that either [Szafranski] 
or [Dunston] would find objectionable,”167 one party cannot decide to use 
the embryos without the other’s consent.  Northwestern is the entity that 
would have to implant the embryos, and the above suggests the clinic cannot 
legally do so without the consent of both parties.  As such, the court erred in 
not considering the consent form as part of the contract between Dunston 
and Szafranski.  Moreover, the drafting of the co-parenting agreement by an 
attorney also sheds light on the fact that Szafranski intended to retain the 
opportunity to have input in the embryo’s possible fruition.168  Though 
neither party signed the contract, it is of the utmost importance that Dunston, 
who knew it would give Szafranski authority over the disposition of the 
embryos, requested it.169 
3. The Danger in Uncertainty as to Binding Agreements 
Szafranski single-handedly “creat[ed] uncertainty about what types of 
agreements between couples themselves and between couples and their 
fertility providers will be recognized as binding.”170  Dunston and Szafranski 
signed a medical consent form provided by the fertility clinic which stated, 
“No use can be made of these embryos without the consent of both partners 
(if applicable).”171  The court ruled that the consent form did not modify the 
oral contract, which explicitly included a provision requiring both parties’ 
consent.172  This is “‘very dangerous for fertility clinics because it’s no 
longer clear that the contracts [the clinic requires] people [to] sign are 
meaningful at all.’”173  It was not appropriate for the Szafranski court to use 
the oral contract as its basis for adopting the contractual approach.  The court 
should holistically consider any agreement between the parties considering 
all the evidence available and not simply based on a single oral contract made 
over the phone.  Doing so would have made it clear that Szafranski did, in 
fact, preserve his right to consent to the fate of the embryos in the Informed 
Consent. 
 
 
the clinic confirmed, that the Informed Consent required both his and Dunston’s approval 
before use of the pre-embryos.). 
 167  Id. at 1155. 
 168  Id. at 1139. 
 169  Id.  
 170  Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Illinois Disputed Embryos Case, ALLIANCE FOR 
FERTILITY PRESERVATION: ALLIANCE BLOG (Mar. 8, 2016), 
http://www.allianceforfertilitypreservation.org/blog/supreme-court-refuses-to-hear-illinois-
disputed-embryos-case.  
 171  Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1135. 
 172  See id. at 1142, 1154, 1156.  
 173  Strom, supra note 87. 
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V. PROACTIVE MEASURES ARE KEY AS A MEANS OF PREVENTING 
OUTCOMES LIKE SZAFRANSKI 
Avoiding cases like Szafranski is easy, but it is the fertility clinic’s 
responsibility to better prepare patients for the potential consequences of its 
services.  The best way to approach this issue is to take the problem out of 
the court’s hands.  This involves being “proactive and resolv[ing] this issue 
by enacting legislation.”174  Advance directives via written agreements that 
anticipate “possible contingencies and . . . specify [patient] wishes in 
writing”175 not only “minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative 
liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the 
first instance a quintessentially personal, private decision [but] also provide 
the certainty needed for effective operation of [IVF] programs.”176  As a 
matter of public policy, states should enact legislation that requires fertility 
clinics to be proactive. Some states have already taken it upon themselves to 
do just that. 
A. Examples of Enacted Legislative Approaches to Disposition 
Agreements 
In Florida, IVF legislation states that: 
all of the decision-making authority concerning the disposition of 
the frozen embryos in the hands of the couple donating the sperm 
and eggs by stating that a “commissioning couple and the treating 
physician shall enter into a written agreement that provides for the 
disposition of the commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm, and 
preembryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any 
other unforeseen circumstance.”177 
The Florida statute also notes that “[a]bsent a written agreement, 
decision-making authority regarding the disposition of the preembryos 
reside jointly with the commissioning couple.”178  As such, when there is a 
contract present and the parties disagree, Florida requires courts to abide by 
the terms of the contract.179  On the other hand, when there is no contract to 
depend on, Florida adopts the contemporaneous mutual assent approach.180  
The statute, however, stops there. 
California law requires that the “health care provider delivering fertility 
treatment . . . provide his or her patient with timely, relevant, and appropriate 
 
 174  See Zizzi, supra note 11, at 412. 
 175  Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (citations omitted). 
 176  Id.  
 177  See Zizzi, supra note 11, at 410 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2005)). 
 178  FLA. STAT. § 742.17(2). 
 179  See generally id.  
 180  See id.  
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information to allow the individual to make an informed and voluntary 
choice regarding the disposition of any human embryos remaining following 
the fertility treatment.”181  Moreover, the statute mandates that the “health 
care provider . . . provide a form to . . . [the party or parties involved] that 
sets forth advanced written directives regarding the disposition of 
embryos.’”182  Finally, California law provides that all involved parties in 
disposition decisions must agree upon one of the directives for the 
disposition.183  If the party or parties involved would like to choose another 
option for disposition that is not on the enumerated list, the couple or patient 
must “clearly state” the alternative option for disposition.184 
While Florida’s statute is effective in implementing a uniform legal 
framework for courts to follow, any legislation, if it is to in fact make a 
difference, should be more similar to California’s statute. 
B. Proposed Model Code: Elements Defined and Implications 
Considered 
The purpose of this model code is to ensure that patients of IVF go into 
treatment with properly drafted contracts to effectively keep disposition 
litigation out of the courts.  As a preliminary matter, the contract should 
include a signature, date, and plain language.185 
1. Thorough Review of Agreement Terms and Stressing Their 
Binding Nature 
To begin, fertility clinics must go over each and every element of the 
agreement with the couple seeking in vitro fertilization.  The length and 
number of consent forms completed before IVF treatment, as well as the 
substance and technicality of the language in those forms, should not be a 
reason to dismiss terms in a contract.  “Patients may regard these forms as 
little more than a ritual to access treatment . . .  [or] perceive that these forms 
exist to protect doctors rather than to contribute to a meaningful, patient-
protective educational interaction.”186  To counter this, clinical personnel 
must ensure parties thoroughly read all documents presented and ask 
questions if they do not understand the technical language read.187  Clinical 
 
 181  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315(a) (2003). 
 182  Id. § 125315(b). 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. 
 185  See id. 
 186  Jody L. Madeira & Barbara Andraka-Christou, Paper Trails, Trailing Behind: 
Improving Informed Consent to IVF Through Multimedia Applications, 3 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 
2, 3 (2016).  
 187  Id. at 22–24 (discussing informed consent interaction and finding personal 
conversations are more helpful to patients in understanding and clarifying the terms of the 
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personnel must sign off on thoroughly reviewing the terms with the patients.  
This will also make clinical personnel liable when essential terms of an 
embryo disposition contract are missing or patients claim they did not know 
of or did not understand a term they agreed to according to the contract.  
Requiring such a signature will make the thorough review of the contract a 
fundamental requirement taken seriously rather than it being considered a 
trivial formality. 
If patients intentionally choose to leave a document unexamined, it 
should not be up to the court to remedy the situation and determine 
ambiguous or absent terms.188  Though informed consent documents provide 
fertility clinics with legal protection,189 such consent forms are also for the 
benefit of the patients themselves.190  In sum, these forms act as a 
precautionary and preventative tool so courts do not have to involve 
themselves in every and all IVF disputes. 
2. Agreeing to Disposition Terms Prior to IVF Procedure 
Participants in IVF treatment must execute a binding agreement prior 
to embryo creation that covers the use and disposition of the embryos in case 
of divorce, illness, incapacity or death of one or both parents, or other change 
of circumstances including but not limited to separation or estrangement.191  
The agreement ought to state explicitly whether an intended parent may use 
the embryos in the event of divorce or other circumstances.192  Also, the 
agreement ought to contain a statement identifying which of the disposition 
methods are impermissible under applicable law.193  For example, some laws 
prohibit embryo donation for certain types of research, and progenitors must 
know this.194  If all parties correctly execute these precautionary steps, a party 
to an embryo disposition agreement cannot be permitted to later withdraw 
consent to the terms and prohibit the use of the embryos to initiate a 
pregnancy.  Allowing revocation by either party down the line would render 
 
consent than simply providing patients with written documents). 
 188  See Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory 
of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1267 (1993) (citations omitted) 
(“[T]raditionally, there has been a so-called duty to read, which binds those who sign or accept 
a contract to the written terms even if they did not read or understand its content.”). 
 189  See Steven B. Dowd, The Legal, Ethical and Therapeutic Advantage of Informed 
Consent, 24 J. NUCLEAR MED. TECH. 129, 129 (1996) (“Obtaining consent from patients . . . 
provide[s] legal protection in . . . malpractice cases.”). 
 190  See id. (discussing that in consent forms patients are educated about risks, benefits, 
and treatment alternatives).  
 191  See, e.g., AMA, supra note 76. 
 192  See, e.g., id. 
 193  See, e.g., id. 
 194  Anne Drapkin Lyerly & Ruth R. Faden, Willingness to Donate Frozen Embryos for 
Stem Cell Research, 317 SCI. 46–47 (2007).  
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any signed agreement meaningless. 
In fact, requiring detailed and complete agreements made prior to IVF 
treatment would work a benefit to society.  Taking the production of embryos 
more seriously may indirectly limit the rapidly increasing number of 
embryos created and frozen.195  “It has been estimated that there are 500,000 
spare embryos frozen with an additional 20,000 embryos added yearly.”196  
Some remain frozen indefinitely.197  Agreements specifically delineating 
methods of disposition will ensure embryos kept in cryopreservation are not 
there for eternity. 
3. Imagining Worst-Case Scenarios and an Effective Way of 
Doing So 
Participants are more likely to take the production of embryos more 
seriously once they know the contracts they are signing are complete and 
binding.  For example, imagining worst-case scenarios together and making 
decisions as to proper disposition if they occur fosters mutual and peaceful 
agreement.  An agreement as to disposition should not be an issue for 
individuals prepared to bring life into the world.  If individuals believe that 
imagining worst-case scenarios puts them in an awkward position,198 courts 
should not remedy the situation and parties should deal with the 
consequences themselves. 
Correctly drafting advance agreements is only possible through 
assistance by attorneys who have dealt with couples in similar situations and 
have experience managing the concerns and desires of couples engaged in 
IVF.  Though it may be a radical requisite, fertility clinics should require 
couples to consult with an experienced reproduction law attorney before the 
clinics can sign off on informed consent documents.  The attorney can be 
one of the participants’ choosing or one on staff at the clinic.  Either way, 
before a clinic can go forward with treatment, the attorney must make sure 
all contracts are as encompassing as they can be in the situation.  Patients 
must fully contemplate all possible scenarios that may arise after treatment.  
An attorney can assist the couple in considering potential scenarios and how 
to contract for the mutual benefit of the parties.  More likely than not, this 
will result in the contractual realization of the couple’s present and future 
desires, wishes, values, and beliefs.  If fertility clinics simply advise patients 
 
 195  Colleen M. Browne & Brian J. Hynes, The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos: Analysis 
and Proposed Guidelines for a Uniform Law, 17 J. LEGIS. 97 (1991) (citations omitted) (“As 
of 1987, there were roughly 4,000 frozen human embryos in existence as compared to only 
300 in 1985.”).  
 196  Clark, supra note 8, at 1. 
 197  Beatty, supra note 15, at 1. 
 198  Strom, supra note 87. 
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to consult with an attorney, many will not and, therefore, they will not obtain 
the expert analysis that would allow them to truly consider all possible 
scenarios and create a properly drafted contract. 
Critics may find it inappropriate to require attorneys to advise patients, 
specifically because the clinic or the patient would bear the cost of doing so.  
These critics, however, must understand that this requirement is a necessary 
means to an end.  IVF procedure is a privilege with heightened responsibility.  
Moreover, some may find it inefficient to require an attorney because of the 
potential for conflicting interests between the parties.  In those cases, the 
parties must use separate attorneys to represent their interests in the final 
contract.  As such, fertility clinics should have multiple experienced 
reproductive attorneys on site or at their disposal. 
4. Using Standardized Forms Correctly and Restricting 
Supplemental Contracts 
Another important practice in IVF clinics is the modification of 
standardized informed consent forms.  Though standardized forms are the 
best way to ensure the inclusion and clear explanation of all the major 
options, parties should be free to modify the standardized form.  Doing so 
largely eliminates the possibility of clinics not properly communicating the 
parties’ intentions with respect to disposition decision.  There are many other 
possibilities couples can consider not typically mentioned in standardized 
forms.199  Such possibilities include “dividing the remaining embryos 
between the parties; allowing for one party to use the embryos, but 
specifying that the ex-spouse not be considered a legal parent under that 
situation, or specifying that parental rights would flow from post-dissolution 
use of any embryos.”200  Many couples would be unaware of their possible 
options if not properly advised.  Thus, the entire contract presented to the 
couple by the clinic should be largely individualized even if it initially begins 
as a standardized contract.  Its creation should imitate the creation of a 
deposition or affidavit as opposed to how an employee fills out a job 
application or a patient fills out a medical form. 
Additionally, any other contracts, regardless of nature, should not be 
able to supplement informed consent forms as in Szafranski.  Supplemental 
contracts, even if drafted by attorneys, only complicate the fertility clinic’s 
ability to properly set forth the agreed upon terms of the contract.  Further, 
if the proper drafting of the original agreement between the parties takes 
place, there should be no need for supplemental agreements.  As such, 
embedding all disposition agreements in the clinic’s informed consent form 
 
 199  Forman, supra note 80, at 78.  
 200  Id.  
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both increases efficiency and eliminates questions regarding the types of 
agreements recognized as binding.  It seems most practical to give the clinic 
the sole responsibility of finalizing a valid and binding disposition contract.  
After all, the clinic is the first to sit with the patients, conducts the IVF 
procedure, and later stores the embryos.  Having a single source of concrete 
guidance as to the disposal of the embryos will also save the clinics, as well 
as patients, time and money when it comes to disputes. 
5. The Overall Benefit 
A model code will not always create a perfect contract; however, 
mandating the creation of complete and integrated binding agreements 
before any procedure takes place is a large step in the right direction.  In the 
end, the goal is to better prepare couples for what may lie ahead if they chose 
to undergo IVF treatment.  Thus, even if a model code avoids a small amount 
of costly litigation for couples, it is a great victory for the regulation of the 
IVF industry.  There will be no need for a court to decide ambiguities like in 
Szafranski.201  The use of seasoned reproductive and family law attorneys 
early on will likely guarantee that no couple will ever enter into an agreement 
that contains determinative ambiguities detrimental to the parties.  For the 
most part, this framework will also do away with the need to balance 
competing interests.  Parties must know from the first instance that their 
agreement will govern regardless of changing desires and should add any 
provisions they feel necessary to protect themselves. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Complete contractual agreements made before the commencement of 
IVF procedures truly capture the intentions of the parties at the time of 
embryo creation.  Ultimately, courts should uphold already contemplated 
terms, rather than trying to decipher parties’ changed intentions.  In 
emotional situations, there must be some concrete guidance as to appropriate 
action without judicial intervention.  Furthermore, if there is no incentive for 
patients to truly consider the risks and benefits of undergoing IVF treatment 
at the onset or if parties can freely change their mind and file lawsuits to 
enforce their new wishes, couples will certainly take less care in making 
these important initial decisions.  A legal framework is necessary to address 
disposition disputes in the fertility industry because it is the only hope in 
giving more structure to the disposition of embryos and provide courts with 
an ability to approach issues systematically.  This, in turn, will benefit all 
IVF patients, as it would have in Szafranski, by helping society avoid forced 
parenthood and other issues that emerge. 
 
 201  See Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
